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Introduction
In June 1979, Piet Koornhof, minister for Cooperation and Development,
proclaimed before the National Press Club in Washington that "apartheid is
dead." He may have been grandstanding, of course, but Koornhof's words also
resonated at home where doubts about ideological orthodoxy were being
expressed both within and outside the state. The Bureau for Economic Policy
and Analysis at the University of Pretoria, with well-developed contacts
within the government and the Afrikaner business community, reported in July
1980 that the "failure of socio-economic growth in the territories of the
Black national states ... is becoming embarassing." The head of the bureau,
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Jan Lombard, referred to "separate development"' as a 'sinking philosophy."
The perception has spread to yet more official "think tanks": BENSO has
published articles that now refer to the failure of the "development para-
digm." Little wonder, then, that outside observers, like John Saul and
Stephen Gelb and Stanley Greenberg,have begun to writ* of an "organic crisis"
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or a "crisis of hegemony."
To understand the ideological ferment in South Africa -- and move beyond
generalized statements about crisis -- it will be necessary to elaborate
the thematic aspects of a disintegrating, dominant ideology and of an emer-
gent, and still fragmentary market-based substitute. This ideological trans-
formation, we shall see, is rooted in political struggles within the state
that center on these thematic changes and that depend profoundly on "connec-
tions" with actors and struggles outside the state.
The ideological transformation in South Africp ^enters thematically on
the entanglement of politics and economics — on the strong state presence
in the labor market and workplace. Conventionally, capitalist development,
whether understood in Marxist or non-Marxist terms, brings a growing differ-
entiation of social spheres and functions; it involves, in particular, a
separation of the political and economic. For Adam Smith, that differentia-
tion is apparent in the ascendancy of markets and entrepreneurs and the
diminution of political directive; for Hegel, in the rightful particularism
of civil society and the universality of the state; and for Habermas, in the
"uncoupling" of the economic system from the political under liberal capi-
talism.
It is out of such processes that the economic, the realm of private
accumulation, gains prestige as a distinct, productive and public-spirited
area of activity; and it is out of the same processes that the state loses
its identity as a private patrimony and emerges as an overarching institu-
tion identified with the public and national interest. With this separation
of the political and economic, the foundations are laid for a modernized,
capitalist and legitimate order.
But for South Africa, the political and economic realms have remained
ideologically and empirically entangled. The state has played a central
role in the market — allocating labor between sectors, controlling and
limiting proletarianization, and suppressing African labor organization.
The National Party and state officialdom, at least until the middle-1970s,
applauded this state presence, preferring "control" to the allocation
decisions of private entrepreneurs and the market.
The ideological struggles in contemporary South Africa center on this
problem. How can the state rise above the particul ST* sm and struggles of
the system of production and emerge as an overarching, national institution?
How can the bourgeoisie emerge as an independent and distinct force, engaged
in private activity, but contributing to the public good? How can the
African working class come to view the economic and political orders as
separate and legitimate? How can political struggles be localized and kept
from engulfing the whole society?
I Ideological Transformation: Developing Currents Outside the State
Our examination of this ideological transformation begins outside the
state, among intellectuals and businessmen who are shaping the ideological
themes and who are positioned politically to influence the ideological
agenda. These groups, we shall see, are party to a discourse and a radically
indeterminate struggle that centers on the problem of legitimation and
autonomy and the uncoupling of the political and economic. For both groups,
this uncoupling has an ideological, rather practical ring: each has sought
to obscure or mystify the state-market relationships rather than to limit
the role of the stats.
4A. Intellectuals: Diminishing the State
During the late seventies, a range of prominent intellectuals, many
of them participants in state commissions or advisory boards, began to
offer skeptical observations about what had passed for conventional
ideology. They questioned the economic viability of the homelands; they
wondered aloud about the future of urban Africans; they asked whether any
system built centrally around racial discrimination could prove legitimate
internally or externally. More broadly, and perhaps more importantly,
Afrikaner intellectuals wondered whether emotive and symbolic notions, like
"separate development" or "apartheid," could any longer offer some hope for
an orderly future. As Hermann Giliomee has observed, apartheid had lost
its hegemonic character and emerged purely instrumental. The consequent
formalism, Lombard writes, has left white South Africa "dissatisfied with
itself" and without "faith in its future." South Africa, consequently, has
had no choice but to "fall back on the abilities of its defence and police
forces to protect the order against external attack and domestic lawlessness."
The first tenet in the search for a new guiding ideology has been the
diminution of the state: state functions are to be dissipated through
decentralization; the centrality of the state is to be offset by denying
the appropriateness of state control over markets, particularly if that
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control is manifest as racial discrimination. P.J. van der Merwe under-
lined these principles in his informed interpretation of the Riekert Com-
mission: "To begin with, the belief in the free market system," charac-
teristic of the commission's findings, "automatically implies a belief in
individual economic freedom, individual economic responsibility and decen-
tralized decision-making or as it is sometimes termed limited government
from the top."
There is a strong emphasis in this developing body of thought on
obscuring the political, limiting its scope, and creating, consequently,
a limited autonomy for the state. Under the present entanglement of
politics and economics, politics is "explosive, a trap." The "more the
functions and power of decision are delegated to government," Lombard
writes, "the more important it becomes to BE the government, or at least
to CONTROL the government and its administration." Following on this
argument, a Pretoria economist -- one closely associated with the business
community -- advocates stripping the state of its historic functions:
It is therefore clearly of crucial importance for constitu-
tional reform that no major decisions about welfare matters
such as income re-distribution, development assistance, educa-
tion, health, housing and the like are taken by the central
authority. Any such link would immediately re-establish the
need for individual and/or group representation in the central
authority.12
The denial of the political has even spawned a revisionist historiog-
raphy. The most eloquent of the revisionist formulations is found in the
introduction to the Wiehahn Commission, presumably authored by its chair-
man, formerly an academic in Pretoria.
The Republic of South Africa subscribes to the principles of a
free market economy based on individual freedom in the market
place. This freedom relates to freedom of choice either as
consumer or as producer, and freedom of competition within a
political democracy. This Ideology has been practised by
successive governments of South Africa since the dawn of the
industrial and commercial history of the country and the
Commission has no reason to believe that this philosophy will
be abandoned. 13
Though Lombard is more sensitive to the laws and administrative prac-
tise that limit the workings of the free economy, he too indulges in selec-
tive minimization of the political reality. After reviewing major pieces
of legislation, including the Marketing Act which fostered European coop-
erative control of commercial agriculture and the Industrial Conciliation
Act which excluded African workers from the statutory collective bargaining
framework, he concludes that "the control functions of state agencies" were
not very important. They amount to little more than the keeping of regis-
ters, the issueing of licenses and the proclamation of agreements." Dis-
crimination was "purely functional." The role of the state "was mainly to
act as an umpire in and a protector of this process." Lombard also denies,
against an impressive body of evidence to the contrary, that Afrikaners
used their control of the state to realize economic gains: "Between 1900
and 1950 the Afrikaner people regarded politics as a means to freedom,
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not as a vehicle for economic advancement."
Pushing the history back further yet, Leon Louw, general secretary of
the Free Market Foundation, argues that the Afrikaner nation was founded on
free-market, anti-statist principles. The free burghers "fought and opposed
big government wherever they went." They even established Republics with
limited governments; the most famous, the Orange Free State Republic of
1876, "provided that there could be no further legislative enactment."
A more developed and theoretically interesting form of mystification
is the notion of "market failure" -- a term that has surfaced in the Riekert
Commission and the works of P.J. van der Merwe and Jan Lombard. The term
is unassuming, as it suggests a principle for limited and legitimate state
control over markets. All capitalist societies, it seems, are permissive
of state meddling in markets where individual, rational market decisions
produce in the aggregate "undesirable" results "from the standpoint of the
community or society."
In this instance, however, our theorists turn a presumed market prin-
ciple into a defense of massive state abrogation of labor markets. Van der
Merwe offers, as a prime example of "market failure," "the social costs as
opposed to the strictly private cost which results from the large scale
importation of workers from the subsistence sector in the Black states in
and around South Africa and which leads to overcrowding, slum conditions,
high unemployment rates, etc. in urban areas." Both van der Merwe and
Lombard observe that Africans may not have acquired the degree of
"rationality" necessary to the effective use of markets, producing sub-
optimum allocation decisions and off-setting state interventions. Lombard
suggests that a "liberal system of influx control or group areas would be
based on the symptoms of civilised behavior (i.e. as demanded by a sophis-
ticated market economy) rather than on colour as such." A system, con-
structed around and rationalized by the notion of "market failure" allows
an elaborate state penetration of markets and, at the same time, an
affirmation of market principles.
Closely related to the first tenet, the diminution of the political,
is a second which elevates the economy over the political as a source of
wealth, employment and the public welfare generally. Sometimes this tenet
emerges as an assertion and a hope. By leaving greater room for economic
forces, the state is in fact opening the way for new forms of job creation.
It "is therefore up to the business sector," van der Merwe writes, "to take
advantage of this climate, to create employment opportunities for Blacks in
metropolitan and decentralized areas and to move Blacks up the occupational
17ladder. For others, the tenet is something more strictly classical:
market processes bring an elaborted division of labor, specialization and
a flowering of productive forces, often stifled by state-directed systems.
"Once every adult participating in the process of production and exchange
is able, willing and free to explore the most profitable application of his
talents, whether intellectual or physical," Lombard writes, "no alternative
system of organization can measure up to the productive performance of the
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market system."
Drawing profoundly on the first two tenets, the market theorists have
raised a third -- the necessity of finding common principles in social
organization. Clearly, a race stratified society based on labor repressive
policies offers few such principles. But in capitalist societies, where
the formal equality of the market is allowed to emerge urtJ where the state
has been disentangled from market exchanges, there is room for broadly
shared ideas. In emphasizing the role of the individual, equality, freedom,
and material advantage, market theorists hoped to enlist the black popula-
tion in a broad-based identification with the society and state. Market
society, Lombard believes, makes possible a "consistent set of basic poli-
19tical principles which will be acceptable to all the people of South Africa."
For many of the theorists, these universal notions -- the market, freedom
and equality -- are a potential counter-idiom to that of socialism and
Marxism. The Free Market Foundation, for one, has conducted surveys among
Africans and uncovered a partiality to "Marxist rhetoric." It proposes to
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offer, in response, a market-based idiom, calling for "economic liberation."
B. Afrikaner Business: Shifting the Locus of Prestige
Afrikaner businessmen in the middle and late seventies began questioning
the overall framework of state policy, although they had played a formative
role in its construction. The Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) -- the
principal Afrikaanse business association, representing medium and large
firms, as well as some cooperatives and quasi-state enterprises -- challenged
directly the efficacy of the homelands policy and state control measures:
"The black stream to the cities will thus become stronger and exert pressure,
despite all our laudable efforts and incentives to decentralisation and
homeland development .... Economic integration of the Blacks is inevitable
and unstoppable if work and welfare is to be created and maintained." In
the absence of a policy responsive to this new reality, whites will face a
growing vulnerability in the face of black discontent:
The danger must be avoided that unemployment, particularly in
white areas, creates a breeding ground for communism. The small
top layer of whites at the pinnacle of the labour pyramid is con-
tinually getting relatively smaller as against the base with a
broad Black foundation.21
Afrikaner businessmen responded to this apparent breakdown in conven-
tional ideology and policy with a two-pronged political initiative. First,
they attempted to shift the locus of prestige and power within Afrikanerdom
from the state to the private sector; and second, they sought to cope with
the evident legitimation problem by providing some space for the urban
African.
Andreas Wassenaar's polemical attack on the Vorster government was,
above all, an attempt to denigrate the value of the political and assert
the supremacy of the economic. He called on the public to "retard or stop
the slide towards ever-increasing state absorption of the private sector,
bit by bit, piece by piece." He countered this trend by elevating the
position of the economic: the "full economy of a country" cannot be "sound
unless the private sector, as a whole, is sound"; the private economy
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represents the "material life of a people."
The elevation of the economic suggests, from this perspective, two
policy-related conclusions: first, the strategic importance of the private
sector in coping with problems of employment and African living standards;
and second, the necessity of curtailing state involvement in the economy,
above all, pulling back on state support for the parastatal corporations.
Both observations, if translated into policy, suggest a shift of public
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attention -- and resources — from areas of traditional state activity to
the private sector. Such an implication is explicit in the expressed views
of the AHI. In the middle seventies, it came increasingly to justify
profits and free enterprise -- a "system that can solve the problem of
23poverty."
Simultaneously, the AHI launched an attack on the public corporations,
particularly the Industrial Development Corporation and the Iron and Steel
Corporation. In 1972-73, the AHI suggested, tentatively and privately,
that these public entities "had gone beyond their terms of reference." By
1976, the Instituut was attacking directly the growing fixed capital of
public corporations and the tendency to destroy the "goose which lays the
golden egg," the private sector. Indeed, its critique was emerging as a
generalized attack on the conventional state role:
It is time to reflect seriously on the slow subversion of our
free enterprise system on which South Africa's growth and pros-
perity is based, and to stimulate private initiative and the
profit motive instead of restricting it. We will have to scrap
the many unnecessary regulatory measures and laws, decrease and
consolidate the unnecessary (government) departments and councils,
make public services more efficient and better remunerated, better
utilise and decrease the number of officials... We make too many
laws to protect and regulate with the result that we are increas-
ingly enslaved to our bureaucracy which controls and regulates us,24
Afrikaner business1 second thematic response involves a pervasive con-
cern with urban Africans — how to improve their living standards and pre-
sumably reduce their discontent? How to provide for some kind of incor-
poration and broadened legitimacy for the social order?
While the prime minister at the first of two historic meetings with
the business community spoke of a "constellation of states," business
participants spoke repeatedly of poor living conditions or unemployment
among urban Africans. These concerns were reiterated at the second meeting
11
in 1981 where businessmen concentrated, in particular, on the housing and
training needs of the industrialized and stabilized portion of the African
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population. The concern, voiced at these conferences, has been institu-
tionalized in the work of the Urban Foundation (supported by English and
Afrikaner businessmen). It has tried, through repetition, to legitimize
the premise that urbanization is "inevitable," "natural," and "desireable."
It has even tried to associate urban communities symbolically with the
emerging economic order: "Urban communities are, by and large, free enter-
prise communities; and thus free enterprise links at every level with the
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complexities of urban life."
The emphasis on urban Africans is part of a narrowly constructed con-
cern with legitimation. Afrikaner businessmen, for the most part, have
sought to uncouple the political and economic in a limited way, in a
limited space, while maintaining the broad framework of state policy,
including homelands and influx control. The AHI offers an interesting
example of this posture. On the one hand, it says that "urban unemploy-
ment and the threats which this entails require serious action" and,
further, that the "black worker in the white areas must be accepted as
an economic necessity, trained and utilised..." On the other hand, it
talks about political incorporation in the homelands: "the challenge is
27
to devise a master plan for division of power, not power sharing." In
the area of collective bargaining, for example^ the AHI consistently
opposed African trade unions prior to their recognition by the government.
"It would appear necessary to subordinate the bargaining power of the trade
"* 28
unions in each case to the national interest," the AHI declared in 1979.
The focus of Afrikaner business was not essentially on uncoupling the
political and economic in the labor field but on stratification. Any new
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dispensation must make room for "stabilised elements/1 an "African middle-
class," and the "black entrepreneur." The African must be given a "stake"
in the system, some form of ownership, such as housing, which can be a
"stabilising influence on Black urban communities." A former president
of AHI observed, ruefully, the African "has participated as a worker, but
he has not shared the sweet fruits of the system."
The precondition for stratification is de-racialization — the strip-
ping away of the least legitimate characteristics of the old order. For
some businessmen, de-racialization has come to mean removing visibly dis-
criminatory measures, particularly those that hamper the position of the
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emerging educated middle-class. For others, the notion involves black
collaboration in the labor control bureaucracy, above all, in influx con-
trol. The AHI seemed to think in 1976 that a homelands (black) takeover
of the labor control administration would end the "incitement of hate
against the Whites -- since in present circumstances the Whites have to
enforce their laws..." The director of the Urban Foundation, while not
wholly supportive of influx control, could envision its retention, "if
32there was bigger black participation in it."
II Continuity and Struggle Within the State
Within the state, there is a broad consensus, opposed to the views of
Afrikaner intellectuals and businessmen, that the state will inevitably
play a larger and larger role in the labor market. Yet within this con-
sensus, there are vast differences in perspective; specifically, on whether
the politicized market is a problem and whether and how one broadens support
for the regime. Where officials stand in this discourse depends very much
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on their role in the bureaucracy and their connections to parties outside
the state.
A. In Defense of Conventional Ideology
While intellectuals and businessmen have been attempting in recent
years to reconstruct state ideology, officials within the labor control
bureaucracy have been holding on to the core tenet -- the state's essential
control over markets. The commitment to this central aspect of traditional
ideology has survived the Soweto disorders and the Biko murder; it has
survived the ideological discourses surrounding the Wiehahn and Riekert
Commissions; and it has survived the apparent coming together of business
and political leaders at the Carleton Centre and at Cape Town's Civic
Centre. Moreover, adherence has not simply lingered in the rural back-
waters or at the bottom of the bureaucratic structure. The entanglement
of politics and economics has remained central to ideological thinking
at all levels.
Officials, wherever they are employed in the structure, describe
their functions in formal and in service terms -- "to bring the employer
and laborer together" (Labor Bureau, Johannesburg), to place people in
employment and to correlate the demand and supply" (LB, Krugersdorp);
"the main purpose is to supply labor according to the demand" (Central
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Transvaal Administration Board).
But the formal responses are nearly always overshadowed by a constant
attention to maintaining "control." "True," one labor official observed,
we bring the employer and employee together, but influx
control is just as,important. It is our job to see that
blacks coming to the urban areas are on an organised basis,
to see that blacks won*t flow to an area where there aren't
facilities (LB, Carletonville).
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Few officials, whether simple operatives at the bottom or policy-makers at
the top, can imagine life in the absence of controls:
If you allow everybody to come in without the necessary docu-
ments, you will have a flooding (East Rand, AB).
You'll have them in the bushes around Cape Town.,.. We are a
developing country and with the political situation around us,
if everything is abolished, the whole of South Africa would be
overrun by the blacks. Then it would be impossible out of the
chaos to maintain an economically sound basis (Western Cape AB).
The influx from tht> rural areas into the urban nrpqn, as else-
where in the world, will be controlled. If you don't do that,
you will create social problems that we will not be able to
handle (Manpower Commission).
The enduring commitment to control translates into two streams of
thought that are difficult to reconcile with the new ideology: first,
officials evidence almost no sympathy or understanding of market princi-
ples; and second, officials envision a growing, rather than diminished
role for the state in the regulation of economic life, particularly over
the movements of African labor.
Hostility to Market Principles
Labor officials who have been tutored in an administered system find
it very difficult to comprehend the market. In the absence of state admin-
istration, one official remarked quizzically, "the employer would have to
get his own labor; he would not end up with the best type of employee."
As for the employee, "there is no control over there; you will have uncon-
trolled entry of blacks" (Port Natal AB). A process that would certainly
seem dear and appropriate to adherents of free enterprise, in official eyes,
appears unseemly:
[without] any inducement for an employer or an employee to
abide by legislation for unregistered employment, there would
be no canalisation whatsoever; with the result that you would
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have undesireable social circumstances. People would flock
in by the thousands. Employers would hire and fire them.
There would be squatting conditions and crime (West Rand AB).
the labor bureaus were abolishedj, how would you regulate
the employee? You would throw the whole labor market open to
whomever wanted to work wherever. What are you going to have
then? It would be chaotic ^Chief Commissioner, Northern Trans-
vaal] .
One official finally asked, "Isn't supply and demand the same as influx
control?" (CC, Natal)
In any event, officials argued, the African is in many respects unpre-
pared for market arrangements. When he cannot find a job in the city, the
African does not return home. "Even with these new penalties," and the
high unemployment, "they are streaming in to the urban areas... They have
a different mentality. You can't always understand these people" (LB,
Kempton Park). That mentality apparently includes a continued attachment
to traditional culture, "even in the industrial situation," and a certain
market impracticality compared with the white man: "These people just
get on the train and they create the problem, like we have at Crossroads"
(Employment Services Committee, Manpower Commission; Deputy Minister).
"A majority of the blacks, the unskilled labourers, has not yet learned
to think for himself, that there is no sense going to a place where there
is no job" (Orange-Vaal AB).
The African's lack of understanding for labor markets leads him,
almost inexorably, to the labor bureaucracy. ."It is in their culture,"
one official observed. "They want somebody to lead them in a direction"
(Employment Services Committee, Manpower Commission). With respect to the
labor market, the "blacks need help" (LB, Boksburg) . "They are so used to
the system now," one official observed, "they expect us to find a job for
them" (LB, Johannesburg).
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Elaborating the State
The ideological discourse outside the state takes as axiomatic the
diminishing role of the state. Within the bureaucracy, at every level,
the opposite is the case. In these offices, there is very strong sense
that pervading market relations bring a corresponding increase in state
efforts to regulate them. Politics, consequently, remains deeply entang-
led in the economic.
The theme is propagated right from the top. An advisor to the min-
ister for Cooperation and Development, member of legislative drafting
committees, and formerly a chief commissioner, speaks eloquently of the
process:
Hopefully, it {[expanding marketsj should bring less Estate regu-
lation], but I know as a fact that it will bring more. How can
you avoid that, because there are bound to be employers who will
take the chance? They will find a loophole somewhere. You fill
the loophole and that means another regulation.
He joined this general observation with a range of specific recommendations
that suggests an overarching state structure: "What I would like to see
is a system in this country whereby the faulting employee, as well as the
faulting employer, are tried in the same forum, simultaneously and punished
in that same forum. We should have new courts -- labor control tribunals."
With regard to labor supplies, he noted, "there is a flaw, a weakness in
our system of distribution ... If we could have a reservoir at a strategic
point, then we could insist that nobody take a shortcut."
For officials at lower levels of the labor bureaucracy, the state role
is simply a common sense extension of their commitment to control. "Per-
sonally," a Kempton Park labor bureau official observed,
I think control will be more needed. You will have more people
looking for work so you will need a proper system to canalise
people, so that you can maintain proper health conditions.
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A Klerksdorp official underlined the presumption with a simple defini-
tiveness:
There should always be control. Control is a very good thing.
Without control, we don't have much of a chance of surviving
-- not just in South Africa but all over the world.... Maybe
less regulation, but control must always be there.
The conclusion that follows from the presumption is an expanded
role for the bureaucracy itself. "Because these are the people who are
handling the labor, who have the experience with the labor," an official
at Carletonville observed, "they must have more to say in the flow of
labor." Across a broad range of administration boards, there was a
feeling that growing industrialization and urbanization, even with recent
"reforms," would bring more labor bureaus, more inspectors, and more state
regulation (LB, East Rand, Western Transvaal, Central Transvaal).
Narrow Legitimacy: Protecting the Locals
The pervasive concern with control is combined, throughout the bureau-
cratic structure, with an expressed desire to protect the position of the
local or urban African population. This concern may seem paradoxical or,
at least, disingenuous, yet nonetheless seems central to the legitimation
of this ideological structure. Officials are concerned, not so much with
broadening support for law and regulation amongst Africans, but instead
with establishing a satisfactory justification for po]icy within the bur-
eaucracy .
In the political climate of the time, maintaining the homelands policy
is insufficient justification in itself, even for these unreconstructed
adherents of the conventional faith. Indeed, at this level, the homelands
are hardly mentioned, except as places where certain categories of workers
35
live.
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Much more important to ideological thinking in the bureaucracy is
the preoccupation with protecting local Africans. At the policy-making
levels, there is a great deal of self-congratulation on this "concession."
"It is now recognized," the chairman of the Manpower Commission declared,
"that the black labor force is there to stay." It is accepted "at the
senior level," the economic advisor to the prime minister observes, "that
increasing numbers of blacks are in the urban areas; and nrovision is
already being made in the plan for the PWV region." The chairman of the
committee responsible for the plan agrees: "Now it has changed, for we
can no longer think of Africans as temporary sojourners. We must rethink;
that is a fact."
The recognition of African permanence is not confined to "reform
circles" at the top. The tenet has equal or greater currency amongst the
outgoing officials and at the lower ends of the bureaucracy = The former
department secretary, for example, is eloquent on the point:
There isn't any doubt in anybody's head that there will be a
permanent black population in the cities. We can't wish them
away. We can't dream them away. You can't carry on with the
factories without these people.
In the old days, some said they were here only as long as they
sold their labor, but that is the old days. Not any more.
The former chief commissioner for the Western Cape says he and the local
authorities have had a "soft spot" for "their locals" -- "their coloureds
and for their local blacks who have been here 20 years and have qualified."
At the level of the administration boards and labor bureaus, the pro-
tection of urban Africans emerges, ideologically, as virtually the primary
preoccupation of the labor control officialdom. The purpose of influx con-
trol is not so much to protect the standards of the white community, as to
ensure the stability of the local black community; it "is to protect the
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local boy, specifically, without any doubt, that is the main reason" (LB,
East Rand). Another official notes, "the main thing to remember is that
the local labor supply must not be exploited. It must be utilized first.
They are the local residents as far as employment is concerned1.' (Carleton-
ville LB).
If influx control were to be relaxed, if the state were to leave the
labor market to its own dynamic, the local labor would be the first hurt.
They would be thrown out of work and their wages unde -cut, as cheap labor
from outside became available. "The locals would starve," a Durban labor
bureau official concludes. A Transvaal official describes dire consequences:
If you do away with the labor bureau, abolish influx control,
everybody will be running in the street, even the Europeans...
We'd have crowding again.... The employer, he wants the outside
people; he's not so fussy.... You would frustrate the local
people and you will get riots (Northern Transvaal AB) .
It is not difficult to understand how such a posture would fit within
the official's general ideological stance. The concern for the welfare of
local Africans is, in fact, a justification for influx control, for contin-
ued state control over the developing labor market. It is an argument that
officials can advance, with good conscience, in a period when politicians
and actors outside the state have begun to question the old order and cast
about for new ideas.
Nonetheless, the concern with the welfare of local Africans is no sub-
stitute for the homelands or the sense of totality in the Verwoerdian vision.
It essentially reinforces the other ideological principles discussed in this
section which together further entangle the political and economic. In the
next section, we will explore attempts within the bureaucracy to grapple
with the contradictions in this ideological posture and with the political
struggles that these contradictions have set in motion.
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B. The Conflict Over Legitimation
There is a reasonable consensus within the labor control bureaucracy
on the necessity of state regulation of African labor mobility. But within
that consensus, officials are greatly divided on how to broaden the legiti-
macy of the political order. Officials at the top are very much concerned
with appearances, with depoliticizing and deracializing the state's role.
They wish to move towards the uncoupling of politics and economics, even
as, paradoxically, they support an expanded state control over the labor
market. Their ideological position reflects a partial assimilation of the
discourse outside the state, a sensitivity to the "positive" pressure of
private employers, and perhaps a greater degree of association with the
private sector.
Further down the bureaucratic ladder, there is less concern with
altering appearances. Officials are more likely to describe existing
arrangements as non-discriminatory and unproblematic. That position
is reminiscent of the legitimations in the traditional racial-state
ideology but not particularly responsive to the problem of broadening
legitimacy.among Africans. These officials, unlike their superiors,
extend their critique of the market to employers who are seen as exploitive
and destructive of broad community interests. They seem, as a result,
38isolated from the new directions in ideological thinking.
Upper-level Officials: De-politicizing the State
While officials at the policy-making level will not easily relinquish
control over the market, they are anxious to put a different face on it.
"The influx control side is still there," one official observes and then
proceeds to a frank account of "uncoupling."
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The impact of influx control will be phased out. In the
future, it will not be a political issue but a practical
issue. In the future, it will be a question of accommoda-
tion and jobs.
In the 1950s, when we started with the labor bureaus, the
main issue was to keep the numbers down. At that time, the
government of the day made that determination. But at this
time, it has been turned around, to get everybody in a job,
to protect them, to give them a service. But the political
sting of influx contrdl is no longer so important. (Employment
Services Committee)
Control based on availability of employment and housing, the chairman of
the Manpower Commission concludes, is "more morally defensible; also more
economically defensible." The economic advisor to the prime minister
generalizes the problem and the government's intent: "The idea of
managing the economy through indirect means still is hard to sell."
The emphasis on "indirect means" carries over into a range of policy
areas, particularly the removal of racially discrimin itory appearances.
Control measures are now applied to Africans, not as \fricans, but as
rural dwellers in a situation of labor surplus. The Manpower Commission
chairman observes:
It is not a question of race discrimination. It just so happens
that blacks are the people in the rural areas. At one time,
there was a political basis for it, but not anymore.
Nicholas Wiehahn, chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into Labor
Legislation and later of the Industrial Court, adopts a more active posture
towards de-racialization, though framed by the same ideological context.
"The problem" with influx control "so far" is "that it has been discrimina-
tory," he observes. "If one retains influx control, it must be made applica-
ble to all citizens," or at least all citizens whose entry into urban employ-
ment would tax water, housing and transportation facilities. The key, he
points out, is "imagery," the imagery of "removing discrimination."
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The attempt at ideological mystification is reflected in the disassoc-
39iation of employers from the market critique. Employers are no longer
seen as the "magnets" creating social problems by attracting black labor;
instead, social problems derive from processes that have been stripped of
their class character. Influx control is necessitated by "development
problems" — the "uneven" location of industrial sites and employment
opportunities (See economic advisor to the prime minister; Industrial
Court).
Officials at this level view employers as the principal pressure
group that has forced the state to face the problem of legitimation. The
disorders in Soweto and elsewhere were important, as were the economic
boom between 1969 and 1972 and the appearance of skilled labor shortages;
but direct action by employers provided the main impetus. "It was an over-
whelming pressure from private thinking," the chairman of the Employment
Services Committee observes. Wiehahn agrees: "Business pressed hard for
such a commission." The coolness that historically separated the state
and business community has now "changed completely," the economic advisor
to the prime minister notes: "With the breakthrough of Afrikaner business-
men into mining and industry, there was a more complete coalition with
business. When Afrikaner businessmen pressed for the same things as
English businessmen, the government began to listen."
Lower-Level Officials: Holding On
Administration board and labor bureau officials apparently have not
been listening or, at least, have operated outside the networks that have
brought greater identification with employer perspectives on the state.
Though groups of intellectuals, Afrikaner businessmen and high officials
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have begun to see the anployer in a public-spirited role, these officials
have remained committed to the traditional ideological posture. In the
halls of the labor control bureaucracy, employers are still the villains
of the piece, putting their immediate labor requirements ahead of the
larger community's interest in limiting the influx of labor.
Wherever you turn in the officials depiction of the labor market,
employers are a disruptive force. At the point of recruitment in the home-
lands, only the officials stand between the African and exploitation. "If
you allow it Jjiirect employer recruitingj , with all respect to my fellow
white man, it leads itself to so much irregularity, bribery and corruption,
to the detriment of the black man," one official notes (CC, Northern Trans-
vaal). In the labor market generally, officials restrain the employer's
exploitive impulses. A Natal official describes his mediating role.
I don't need to tell you that labor is a commodity like any
other commodity. The employer will go for an illegal worker
who will be cheaper... It is our responsibility to protect
the permanent resident... There is exploitation. In our
own way, we are trying to use the legal system to fight this
exploitation.
The officials on the ground, working directly with the African worker
and most removed from the heady discourses at the top, are uniformly hostile
to the role of business. Indeed, they seem to define their role in direct
opposition to the employer:
You simply have to protect these local blacks. These employers
want a black from the outside. He is normally illegally in the
area and he will give a higher standard of work; he will take
more from an employer before getting fed up. But as soon as
they get the right to be in the area, they are the same as the
local ones. But the employer is always seeking the outsider
(LB, Carletonville).
Though I'm a white man, as far as I'm concerned, alot of white
employers will take advantage of the black man (LB, Klerksdorp).
Employers -- some employers -- prefer contract workers. If we
get a slack of employment and we want to place the local people,
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they moan. They say we always used these people. Some of these
employers are very clever; they are only interested in their
pockets. The outside man is prepared to work for a lower wage
(LB, Boksburg).
In their isolation from the mainstream of the ideological discourse,
officials at this level have remained reasonably indifferent to the broader
legitimation problem. There is almost no mention here of depoliticizing
labor control, that is, removing the visible state presence in the market.
They seem little concerned with changing the racial chs* • ' er of state
institutions. Indeed, most of these officials deny that these institutions
in their present form have a racial character. "It is not discriminatory,"
a Boksburg official declares.
We are there to help them. When I took one of the boys to
Umtata to recruit labor, I had to show my book, just like him.
It didn't bother me. Why should it bother them?
An official at Kempton Park is equally adament in his denials:
I can't accept that we have any [[discrimination] here at all,
except that we only deal with blacks. Our machinery is not
set to handle whites. We mainly cater to the ordinary laborer.
Officials in the administration boards are willing to entertain recent
proposals that would consolidate departments and bring blacks and whites
under a uniform administration. But, like the labor bureau officials below
them in the hierarchy, they tend to deny that existing structures are tainted
by a racial character -- and, therefore, illegitimate. "As far as I am
concerned, it is not discrimination," a Transvaal official says. "In the
case of the Bantu, you have the numbers that count; so you have to control
to avert chaos" (Central Transvaal AB). The chief commissioner for the
Witwatersrand adopts a similar stance: "influx control would have been
necessary even if all rural blacks were poor white. We would have to have
the same control." An official at the East Rand board concludes with a
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definiteness that seems to negate the problem:
There is no racial discrimination in a labor bureau. There is
no race in this. This is labor, even though the laborer is a
black man and the employer a white man.
III. The Political Leadership: The Political Use of Ideas
Some fractions of the National Party, now organized in the opposition,
ritualistically affirm conventional tenets about the homelands and urban
Africans. Even within the government, there are centers of traditional
thought. The deputy minister for Cooperation and Development still talks
about "keeping the numbers down" and the need for more "regulation with a
greater influx of people." Some state agencies, like the South African
Broadcasting Corporation, as late as 1976, were reaffirming core philosophic
notions: there is a "natural" split between "economic man and spiritual
man" and the latter can only be realized amongst one's "people"; "the
Black man will be stunted and frustrated if he is isolated from the main-
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stream of his people and is culturally alienated"; the black man "cannot
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survive, let alone fulfill himself, as a fragmented, isolated individual";
42the greater and the greatest must be attained by him within his own nation."
But those currents have been isolated within the media and within the
state. The ascendant political leadership begins with two premises: one,
articulated by the minister of Cooperation and Development, that "apartheid
is dead"; the other, articulated by the prime minister himself and every
major commission in recent years, that the "maintenance of free enterprise"
is "the basis of our economic and financial policy." But what do political
leaders intend when they advance these grand ideological notions? Are they
constructing a new state ideology?
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Political leaders offer what probably should be characterized as a
formal and correct affirmation of free market tenets. Prime Minister
Botha supported new financial policies that have allowed floating exchange
rates, reduced marginal tax rates, and limits on capital investment by
43parastatal enterprises. He, and other members of the government, speak
freely of the economic bounty in free enterprise. His finance minister,
drawing directly on Adam Smith, states that free enterpr^sr makes possible
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an "unprecedented rise in real wealth and income." rii.uiLy, the political
leadership has adopted as convention the diminished rol. .>!' the state in
economic affairs. The finance minister again states the principle: "...
private enterprise must be considered the norm and State interference with
private enterprise must be regarded as a deviation from the general princi-
ple, to be justified in each instance by reference to the special circum-
stances of the case."
The affirmation, however, is not part of a well-integrated or widely
accepted body of thought. As the advisor to the prime minister points out,
free enterprise principles are not well understood in the bureaucracy,
even in the economic departments, and "there is not much clarity" at the
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"cabinet level."
For the political leadership, fret enterprise is largely a strategic
political' resource. It provides a loose set of principles, and some emotive
terms, upon which the state can organize opposition to external forces,
broaden support for the regime among Africans, and enlist business's
economic resources in new state initiatives.
A. Countering Marxism
Free enterprise is, above all, a counterpoint to the Marxist, "total
onslaught" -- both external and domestic. On the external front, the prime
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minister has associated free enterprise with South Africa and counterposed
it to the tyranny and subversion that comes with Marxist regimes: "The
order which Marxism creates leaves no room for freedom." The minister of
defense, General Magnus Malan, believes South Africa is caught up in a
"communist-inspired onslaught" which intends the "overthrow of the present
constitutional order and its replacement by a subject communist-oriented
black government." South Africa's association with free enterprise is
part of a broader association with "free" nations opposed to such an
onslaught.
Because a direct assault from outside seems implausible, the main thrust
of the onslaught is on domestic subversion, thus the concern with legitimation.
By associating free enterprise with the regime, political leaders apparently
hope to broaden opportunities for a shared identification with the existing
social and political order. Koornhof views this association as the primary
task before the government -- how to prevent lingering dissatisfaction from
becoming an anti-regime ideology and how to form a new ideology that enlists
49black cooperation.
Support for the ideological project is strong across the ascendant
political leadership. The defense white paper in 1977, organized by
General Malan, sets the stage by asserting the need to enlist the "entire
population, the nation and every population group" in the "national strategy."
The Human Sciences Research Council plan for the early 1980s places a consider-
able emphasis on "the susceptibility of the various cultural groups to
ideologies." To organize support around a free enterprise ideology,
political leaders understand that Africans will have to be provided reasons
for becoming adherents. The prime minister told the Carleton Centre conclave
that the "benefits must be made apparent"; the finance minister told a
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gathering on free enterprise that "the man on the shop floor must have the
feeling that for him or his children there are no insurmountable barriers
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B. Enlisting Business Support
Free enterprise also represents an idiom and bargaining resource that,
political leaders hope, will bring closer business-state cooperation. Such
a trade was evident at the outset of the Carleton Center meeting with busi-
ness leaders, when the prime minister outlined "free enterprise" concessions
to business: restrictions on government investment and the "release of
resources to the private sector", lower tax rates, and the "general deregu-
larisation of the economy as evidenced by the re-examination of price, rent
and exchange control." Moreover, he drew a clear line between the proper
role of government and the proper role of business:
I believe we in government must understand that economic growth
as such is mostly the responsibility of private enterprise. Of
course, governments have a key role to play in areas such as the
creation of physical and social infrastructure. Essentially,
however, it is private enterprise which combines all the elements
of production to produce wealth... No government can successfully
prescribe to private enterprise what to produce, how to produce,
for whom to produce, and where to invest."
In exchange, the prime minister appealed to business leaders for greater coop-
eration in the implementation of government policy; specifically, for business
leaders to invest in the homelands and deconcentration points:
In the extension of co-operation the Government can, however,
only create a framework; the greatest real contribution to the
extension of those relationships lies in the domain of the busi-
ness sector. If you as business leaders extend your activities
within our region in an innovative and energetic manner, you will
be making a significant contribution to the happiness and well-
being of all those peoples who make a living under the Southern
Cross.53
While Botha posed this exchange at a high level, other observers and ,
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political leaders have focused on the more directly political form of the
bargaining process. An Afrikaner businessman who served on the Wiehahn Com-
mission suggests that a loose free enterprise ideology is part of an accom-
modation between the government and business, at the expense of white workers.
The state could not address the question of legitimation, unless it "could
break the power structure of the whites." For that, the government had to
enlist the prestige and position of Afrikaner businc-rmen.
At the cabinet level, the accommodation around free enterprise concepts
may represent an attempt to reconstitute the political process around techno-
cratic criteria. "For most cabinet members," the economic advisor to the
prime minister observes,
Cfree interprisej means forming a coalition of government and big
business. It brings the Latin American model to mind. There is
a belief, if only leading business people and leading government
officials can get together, they can work out the country's problems.^
IV Ideological Dissolution
It should be apparent from this extended discussion that the racial-state
ideology, forged during the 1950s and 1960s, had yielded from the mid-1970s
to widespread disunity. The dissolution of the ascendant ideology is
apparent in the disintegration of thematic unity and the emergence of con-
flicting perspectives within and outside the state.
The developing contradiction of an entangled ^ulitical-economic order
has spun off groups of diverse position and perspective. Officials at the
bottom of the labor control bureaucracy, very much isolated from the growing
association with business and weakened politically by the general isolation
of white workers, has sought to defend their function and some of the tradi-
tional ideological tenets. They have not placed much emphasis on efforts to
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deracialize and depoliticize labor control activities and continue to view
employers as a threat to the white community. Officials at the policy level,
while insisting on the maintenance of market control, have struggled with
the implications of a politicized market and of black disaffection. In con-
trast with other officials, they have attempted to define a positive role
for employers. Political leaders have siezed on the idiom in free enter-
prise to build a closer alignment with business, though they have not
addressed with clarity the problem of an elaborated state role in the labor
market. In policy terms, the state remains deeply mired in the market; in
ideological terms, political leaders have hardly begun to elaborate the
themes, raised by Afrikaner intellectuals and businessmen, for disentangling
the political and economic.
The dissolution of state ideology is also apparent in the acrimony that
has accompanied the growing differences in ideology and connection to dom-
inant class actors. Andreas Wassenaar, chairman of one of South Africa's
largest financial enterprises, intitated the public encounter by declaring •
that the government, particularly the bureaucracy, is the "foe."
Officials, with close ties to the business community and the present
political leadership, have subsequently come into direct conflict with the
labor control bureaucracy. The chairman of the Manpower Commission observes
that officials in Cooperation and Development are "a real problem... They
wear blinkers," (By contrast, officials at Manpower Utilization, "much
more closely associated with business," are seen as able to implement
policy.) A principal advisor on the Riekert Commission, and now an official,
observes that "the bureaucrats in the various sections are now as cold as
ice to me." His experience was shared by a chairman of one of the labor
reform commissions who observes that, when visiting the minister of
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.Cooperation and Development, "the people don't talk to me -- the upper level
of civil servants. Those that aided in the preparation of the report are
deeply opposed to the policy recommendations." He declares, with remarkable
boldness, that we have "to break the mafia that could think of no other way
of dealing with the black man" and concludes, with some confidence, that
"the private sector will not allow the mafia to kill these proposals."
32
FOOTNOTES
1. Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis, Focus on Key Issues: Political
Stability, No. 26, University of Pretoria, July 1980.
2. Jan Lombard, On Economic Liberalism in South Africa, Bureau for Economic
Policy and Analysis, University of Pretoria, I ), p. 25.
3. For an example, see R.J.W. van der Kooy, "In Search of a New Economic
Development Paradigm for Southern Africa: an Introduction," Development
Studies Southern Africa 2 ( ), p. 22.
4. John S. Saul and Stephen Gelb, The Crisis in South_Africa: Class Defense,
Class Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981., pp. 1-8; Stanley
B. Greenberg, Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative Per-
spectives. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980, pp. 398-403.
5. Saul and Gelb provide an excellent analysis of the crisis in South Africa,
its structural roots and political manifestations; they spend less time
discussing the content and transformation of dominant ideology.
6. By beginning with intellectuals and businessmen, I do not mean to imply
that the initiative for this discourse originated outside the state. There
is credible evidence suggesting an interactive process, with political
leadership inviting the questioning and initiative of business and intel-
lectuals.
7. Hermann Giliomee, Parting of the Ways: South African Politics 1976-82.
Cape Town: David Philip, 1982, pp. x-xi; notes 1-3; also Robert T.
Tusenius, "Prosperity Southern Africa," Proceedings of the South African
Economic Convention, 27 June-28, 1979, p. 28.
8. Jan Lombard, "Cause of the Black Welfare Economy," in Volkshandel, March
1978; Lombard, On Economic Liberalism in South Africa, Bureau for Economic
Policies and Analysis, University of Pretoria, { ) , p. 54.
9. There are two other principles to be considered later, but both follow from
the first.
10. P.J. van der Merwe, "An Analysis of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower," Finance and Trade
Review 13 (June 1979), p. 34.
11. Lombard, On Economic Liberalism, p. 16, 34.
12. I was asked by this individual not to attribute this document to him or
any organization.
13. Republic of South Africa, Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation
(Wiehahn), p. 181.
14. Lombard, On Economic Liberalism, pp.
33
15. Lombard, On Economic Liberalism, pp. 12-13, 30-31. See Heribert Adam
and Hermann Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1979, pp. ) for a discussion of the Afrikaner economic
advance.
16. van der Merwe, "An Analysis," pp. 34-36; Lombard, On Economic Liberalism,
p. 8, 23, 39.
17. van der Merwe, "An Analysis," p. 56; also see Willie Breytenbach, "The
Botha Strategy and the 'Eighties1.11 South Africa Foundation, Briefing
Papers, No. 5, July 1980.
18. Lombard, On Economic Liberalism, pp. 17-18, 34-35.
19. Ibid., pp. 33, 51.
20. Interview, general secretary, Free Market Foundation. See also, Free
Market 1 (1980), p. 26; and Jan Lombard, "Socio-Economic Prospect for
the Eighties," speech before Institute of Personnel Management, Pretoria,
September 23, 1981, p. 5.
21. Volkshandel, April 1976, trans. MT. In October 1981, Volkshandel
published a strong editorial reiterating these themes.
22. A.D. Wassenaar, Assault on Private Enterprise: Freeway to Communism.
Tafelberg, 1977, pp. 65,67.
23. Interview, former president, Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut; also Volks-
handel , May, 1976, trans. MT
24. Interview, former president, AHI; Volkshandel, March 1977, May 1976,
trans. MT
25. "Toward a Constellation of States," meeting between the prime minister
and business leaders, Carleton Centre, 22 November 1979, pp. 24, 29;
"A Regional Development Strategy for Southern Africa," meeting between
the prime minister and business and community leaders (Good Hope)
Civic Centre, Cape Town, 12 November 1981, pp. 32-36.
26. J.H. Steyn, "The Quality of Life in our Future Towns -- Services Hold
the Key," South Africa Institute of Civil Engineers, 1980, pp. 3-4;
Steyn, "Free Enterprise and Urban Communities," National Conference of
the 1820 Settlers National Monument Foundation, November 1979, p. 1.
27. Volkshandel, June 1977, trans. MT; August 1978.
28. Volkshandel, June, 1979.
29. J.G. van der Horst, Old Mutual, at Good Hope Conference, p. 37.
30. Interview, former president, AHI. 98. F.J.C. Cronje, Nedbank, Good
Hope Conference, p. 40; also AHI memorandum to the Wiehahn Commission,
Volkshandel February 1978.
34
31.
32. Volkshandel, April 1976; Interview: Urban Foundation.
33. This report on the interview material concentrates on the main lines of
thought. It does not include, for lack of space, a discussion of the
exceptional views which pepper the bureaucracy.
34. During the period, February 1979 to April 1982, I conducted interviews
with individuals holding positions at various levels within the labor
control framework and with individuals in strategic positions outside.
A list of the state interviews is presented below:
Policy Makers
Chairman, Manpower Commission
Director, Manpower Commission
Chairman, Employment Services Comm., Manpower Commission
Special Assistant to the Minister for Cooperation and Development
Deputy Minister for Department o£ Cooperation and Development
Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister
Senior Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank
Chairman, Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation
Chairman, Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the
Utilisation of Manpower
Deputy Secretary for Labour, Department of Cooperation and Development
Middle-Level: Chief Commissioners (CC)
Witwatersrand, Western Cape, Natal, Northern Transvaal
Middle-Level: Chairman or Director of Administration Boards (AB)
Central Transvaal, Western Cape, Western Transvaal, West Rand,
Port Natal, East Rand
Middle-Level: Directors of Labor, Administration Boards (AB)
Central Transvaal, Western Transvaal, East Rand, Orange-Vaal,
West Rand, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Port Natal, Northern Transvaal
Lower-Level: Directors of Labor Bureaus (LB)
Carletonville, Johannesburg, Krugersdrop, .Klerksdorp, Lichtenburg,
Germiston, Boksburg, Kempton Park, Langa, Grahamstown, Durban,
Empangeni, Pretoria, Mabopane
35. It is interesting that the strongest affirmation of the homeland connec-
tion came from two officials who had lost their positions. A former
department secretary spoke of homelands in genuine national terms; "...
if a chap just gets on a train, he is breaking the laws of his country
and my country." A former chief commissioner in the Western Cape used
a similar idiom: "Every government has the right to have its borders
protected."
35
36. At the upper levels of the bureaucracy, officials still stress the
importance of continued political outlets in the homelands. They speak
about "representation in the national states" and the possibilities
for economic, though not political integration in the white areas
(Employment Services Committee; Manpower Commission) . On occasion,
there is mention of African interest in an election in QwaQwa (CC,
Northern Transvaal); even more occasionally, there are strong affirma-
tions of the traditional sort: "They have their own states where they
can be state president" (Central Transvaal AB). But such affirmations
are rare, overshadowed by descriptive or instrumental accounts of the
connection.
37. Their critique of the market does not include a critique of the role of
private employers; in their reflections on "labor reform," they suggest
that employer pressure has been the most important consideration.
38. Their scattered impressions about the impulse for "reform" includes
almost no reference to the private sector.
39. The former officials at this level, unlike the present officials continue
to view employers as associated with the problem. The former chief
commissioner for the Western Cape describes the squatter problem after
the war as an "employer's paradise."
40. SABC, Current Affairs, July 17, 1974.
41. SABC, Current Affairs, December 3, 1975.
42. SABC, Current Affairs, June 11, 1976.
43. See Nigel Bruce, "Monetary Policy on the Mend." Energos (1980).
44. Owen Horwood, opening address, National Conference of the 1820 Settlers'
Monument Foundation, 19 November 1979, pp. 24-25.
45. Ibid., p. 3. One should contrast this quote with the ideological
position discussion on pp.
46. The director of the Urban Foundation made a similar observation.
47. P.W. Botha, opening address, Carleton Centre Conference, p. 10.
48. Magnus Malan, quoted in Deon Geldenhuys, VSome Foreign Policy Implica-
tions of South Africa's 'Total National Strategy1, with particular
reference to the '12 point plan.1" The South African Institute for
International Affairs, March 1981, p. 3.
49. Rand Daily Mail, 12 October 1979.
50. Republic of South Africa, White Paper on Defense 1977.
51. Human Sciences Research Council, "Possible National Research Programmes.1
36
52. P.W. Botha, opening address, p. 11; Horwood, opening address, pp. 19-20.
53. Botha, opening address, pp. 11-12, 21; also comments at Good Hope
Conference, pp. 20-21.
54. See the discussion of "technocratic ideology" in Giliomee, The Parting
of the Ways, pp. 35-40.
55. Wassenaar, Assault, pp. 85-87.
